Honeynet Project Forensic Challenge 2010

Tuesday, January 12. 2010
Finally, after several years without any Honeynet Project Challenges, there will finally be new Forensic Challenges starting next Monday (January 18th, 2010). Here is the official announcement:
I am very happy to announce the Honeynet Project Forensic Challenge 2010. The purpose of the Forensic Challenges is to take learning one step farther. Instead of having the Honeynet Project analyze attacks and share their findings, Forensic Challenges give the security community the opportunity to analyze attacks and share their findings. In the end, individuals and organizations not only learn about threats, but also learn how to analyze them. Even better, individuals can access the write-ups from other individuals, and learn about new tools and techniques for analyzing attacks. Best of all, the attacks of the Forensic Challenge are attacks encountered in the wild, real hacks, provided by our members.
It has been several years since we provided Forensic Challenges and with the Forensic Challenge 2010, we will provide desperately needed upgrades. The Forensic Challenge 2010 will include a mixture of server-side attacks on the latest operating systems and services, attacks on client-side attacks that emerged in the past few years, attacks on VoiP systems, web applications, etc. At the end of challenge, we will provide a sample solution created by our members using the state-of-the-art tools that are publicly available, such as libemu and dionaea.
The first challenge (of several for 2010) will be posted on our Forensic Challenges web site on Monday, January 18th 2010. We will be open to submissions for about two weeks and announce the winners by February 15th 2010. This year, we will also award the top three submissions with prizes! Please check the web site on Monday, January 18th 2010 for further details….

Christian Seifert

Full details will be published at http://honeynet.org/challenges.

Update: The date was apparently wrong, I corrected it from January 15th to January 18th.

Walowdac – Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet

Sunday, January 3. 2010
One of the most interesting botnets of 2009 was Waledac: the botnet implements a peer-to-peer-based communication channel and it can be seen as the successor of Storm Worm, since it implemented many similar ideas (e.g., a very similar language for spam templates was used). The researchers from Trend Micro had published an analysis of the botnet and we also examined the botnet. The result is a paper entitled "Walowdac - Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet": instead of passively observing the network, we implemented an active infiltration component. We emulate the protocol of a bot and are able to observe the inner communication aspects of the network. As a result, we obtain an in-depth overview of the botnet that enables us to study different aspects of the network, e.g., efficiency of the spam campaigns or number of active bots. As a small peak of the results, the following pictures shows the number of active bots in different countries on a specific day in August 2009. We can for example observe diurnal patterns and clearly see the effects of timezones on the size of the botnet:


Abstract:
A botnet is a network of compromised machines under the control of an attacker. Botnets are the driving force behind several misuses on the Internet, for example spam mails or automated identity theft. In this paper, we study the most prevalent peer-to-peer botnet in 2009: Waledac. We present our infiltration of the Waledac botnet, which can be seen as the successor of the Storm Worm botnet. To achieve this we implemented a clone of the Waledac bot named Walowdac. It implements the communication features of Waledac but does not cause any harm, i.e., no spam emails are sent and no other commands are executed. With the help of this tool we observed a minimum daily population of 55,000 Waledac bots and a total of roughly 390,000 infected machines throughout the world. Furthermore, we gathered internal information about the success rates of spam campaigns and newly introduced features like the theft of credentials from victim machines.

The paper was joint work with Ben Stock, Jan Göbel, Markus Engelberth, and Felix C. Freiling. The full paper is available at http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/waledac-ec2nd09.pdf and it was published at EC2ND 2009.